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STATEMENT 01' THE CASE 
This case was brought by Plaintiffs, after judgment had 
been obtained against them on a not~ held by defendant Bank 
of Ephraim, to force defendant Bank to apply security held 
by them against the debt before proceeding against the 
Plaintiffs on the judgment obtained, and for damages against 
all defendants arising out of various charges of interference 
with business relations and harrassment. Defendants Barton 
counterclaimed on various grounds, including obligations due 
from the Plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN 'IHE LOWER COURT 
After trial before the Honorable- Peter F. Leary, Judge 
in the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven 
of Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed by tt.e Court 
and the remaining three causes of action were submitted to 
the jury, resulting in verdicts for Defendants and against 
Plaintiffs. The counterclaim of defendant BeEtha Barton was 
disrr•issed by the court, as was one counterclaim of defendant 
George Barton; the remaining five countE·rclaims of defendant 
George E2rton were subn;i tted to the jury, resulting in 
verdicts for defendant B~rton OL three causes of action and 
against defend~nt BaEton on two causes of acticn. 
- l -
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respcandents respectfully request the Court to sust.ain 
the judgment given by the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents essentially agree with the statement of 
facts set forth in Appellants' brief, with the following 
exceptions: 
1. Appel] ants refer (p. 3 of Appellants' brief) to 
various "considerations" allegedlj' given by Kennedy to 
Barton to induce Barton to endorse Kennedy's note with the 
Bank of Ephraim. Plaintiffs disagree that .:.ny such considera-
tions were received by Barten. In particular, a check for 
$499.98 given by Kennedy to Barton at the time of the leoan 
from the Bc.nk of EFhraim is alleged by Kennedy to have be£r, 
a "commission" or "finde:r's fee". The record shows con-
flicting evidence as to the nature of this check; Barton's 
testimony (R. 801-802) was to the effect ttat this was a 
payment on an exist.ing debt, and not in any EEr,se a "finder's 
fee". 
2. Appellants' reference to the prior judgment obtainec 
against the~ in Sanpete County, Utah on July 19, 1973 (p. 
of ~ppellants' brief) does not fully explain the circum-
- 2 -
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stances surrounding that judgment. These circumstances are 
explained in the affidavit of Judge Ma"L·.r_ice Harding, who 
tried the case on June 29, 1973 (copy of affidavit is 
contained on R. 311-312). In that affidavit, Judge HarC.ing 
explains that Charles Kennedy, who was a defendant in that 
action, on the day befc·re the trial requested anotter 
continuance on the basis of defendant Rebecca Kennedy's 
medical condition. The court instructed Kennedy at that 
time that a continuance would only be granted if defendant 
Rebecca Kennedy obtained a medical certificate stating that 
her medical condition would not allow her to appear in 
court. Defendants Kennedy failed to provide the certificate 
and failed to appear in court on the following day - the day 
of the trial - although they were represented there by 
counsel. After evidence was heard by the court, defendants' 
counterclaim was dismissed by the court and judgment was 
entered in favor of plaintiff Bank of Ephraim. 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WHICH REQUIRE THEM TO PAY 
THEIR DEBTS OWING TO THE BANK OF EPHRAIM SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Plaintiffs advance numerous theories throughout their 
brief as to why this Court should force the Bank to apply 
the Certificate of Deposit belonging to Barton against the 
amount owing by the Kennedys on their loan from the Bank. 
None of these theories withstand thoughtful examination. 
Correct application of the law to the facts of the case ---
as correctly stated result in the conclusion that the 
Kennedys are liable for this debt and must pay the judgment 
already obtained against them. 
Plaintiffs' arguments are a confused mixture of misinter-
pret.ed facts, irrelevant authority, unsupported concll<sions, 
and issues that cannot be raised on appeal. They seem to 
boil down to the following: 
1. Barton is obligated to pay this note, through the 
Certificate of Deposit or otherwise, before the Kennedys 
becc•rre obligated. 
2. There was an oral agreement that the Certificate 
of Ceposit should be tl.e first source of funds on default. 
- 4 -
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3. Barton and the Bank conspired, and/or Barton used 
undue influence in his position as Bank Director, to see 
that Barton would never have to pay the note. 
4. The equities of the case require Barton, rather 
than the Kennedys, to pay the note. 
5. Res judicata does not apply. 
These arguments will be addressed, and refuted, separately 
in the remainder of this brief. 
A. The Kennedys, as makers and principal debtors on 
the note, are primarily liable for this debt, 
while Barton, as a guarantor or accommodation 
endorser, is only secondarily liable. 
The last renewal note on the loan to the Kennedys (copy 
attached to Exhibit 58-d), upon which a judgment was had 
against the Kennedys on July 19, 1973, was signed by both of 
the Kennedys individually and was endorsed on the back by 
Barton as follows: 
For value received, we hereby guarantee payment of the 
within note, waiving demand of payment, protest and 
notice of non-payment. 
/s/ Charles R. Kennedy 
/s/ Rebecca z. Kennedy 
/s/ George Barton 
The signature of Barton on the back of the note, under words 
of guarantee, evidences his status as a guarantor of the 
note, rather than as a comaker with the Kennedys. Language 
almost identical to the above endorsement signed by Barton 
- 5 -
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was helc by the Supren'e Court of North Dakota to create a 
guarantcr relationship. In Northern State Bank v. Bell~, 
19 N.D. 509, 125 N.W. 888 (1910), the Court held that one 
who endorses a promissory note, "For value received, I 
hereby guarantee the F<.yment of the within note and hereby 
waive presentment, demand, protest, and notice of protest," 
and receives no consideration or benefit from the loan made 
to the principal debtor upon the execution of the note, is a 
guarantor of payment. 
The contract of guaranty cr~ates a secc.ndary liability. 
Ibid.; Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Wolf, 309 Mass. 
547, 36 N.E.2d 390 (1941). In Charlestown the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts said: 
"The word 1 guarantee 1 appearing in the merr.oranocrr. 
[on the face of the note) suggests, not a primary, but 
a collateral undertaking. The ordinary meaning of the 
word is that someone else is primarily liable for a 
debt and that the guarantor will pay it if the primary 
debtor does not." 36 N.E. 2f 390 at 391. 
Under the Ur.ifonn Commercial Code, as enacted in Utah, 
Barton is en accommodation party and has a rigrt cf recourse 
against the Kennedys, the accommodated parties: 
- 6 -
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amenced, §70A-3-415: 
(1) An accommod<:.tion party is one who signs the 
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending 
his name to another party to it. 
********** 
(5) An accorr~odation party is not liable to the 
party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a 
rigtt of recourse on the instrument against such party. 
When he signed this note as guarantor, Barton lent his name 
to the Kennedys to enable them to get the loan. He did it 
at their reque·~<t and he received none of the proceeds of the 
loan --- the Kennedys used the proceeds tc purchase land in 
Montana which they still own. Plaintiffs argue that Barton 
received consideration for lending his name (Appellants' 
brief, pp. 3 & 6), but these were disputed facts in the-: 
trial (R. 685-689, 740-741, 793-794, 801-802, 807-808). 
Barton's testimony was that he accepted the check for $499.98 
given to him by Kennedy at the time of the original loan 
from the Bank as payment on an existing debt owed him by 
Kennedy, and not as a "commissicr. ,. for lending his name on 
the loan (R. 801-802). However, even if Plaintiffs had 
established that Barton received scme con~ideration for the 
lendir.c; of his name, that would not affect his status as an 
accornrr:odation party. "Paper may be accommodation paper, 
- 7 -
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although 'induced' by a nominal, or even actual, considera-
tion;" the test is whether the accommodation party received 
value for lending his name, rather than on the instrument. 
11 C.J.S., Bills & Notes §742. 
Under §70A-3-415, U.C.A., 1953, and the law governing 
the guaranty relationship, Barton's obligation on the note 
is secondary to that of the Kennedys. The Kennedys, as 
principal debtors and accommodated parties, are primarily 
liable for this note, and their assets should be exhausted 
before recourse is had to Barton, either through his certifi-
cate of deposit or his other personal assets. 
B. Since Plaintiffs introduced no evidence at trial 
regarding an alleged oral agreement concerning 
the use of the Certificate of Deposit as first 
source of funds on default, that issue cannot be 
raised on appeal. 
A large part of Appellants' brief (pp. 5-10 of the 
brief) presupposes the existence of an oral agreement that 
the Certificate of Deposit was to be the first source of 
funds on default and cites authority which is supposedly to 
the effect that such an oral agreement can be an enforceable 
modification of the loan contract between the Bank and the 
Kennedys. This seems to be the major contention of the 
Plaintiffs' appeal with respect to the Bank, and it is an 
- 8 -
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agrument that must fail because the Plaintiffs did not 
address the issue at the trial and did not produce any 
evidence whatsoever that would tend to show the e:l<istence of 
such an oral agreement. 
The issue of the existence of tt.e alleged oral agreement 
was not raised by the Plaintiffs in their Amer.ded Complaint, 
in any of the depositions, or in any of their answers to 
interrogatories. It was raised for the first time in the 
affidavit of Cbarles Kennedy dated March 14., 1977, which wa~. 
submitted just before the hearing on the Eank's last Motion 
for Summary Judgment before trial. Because of the existence 
of this issue, the Motion for Summary J~_;dgment "~>·as denied 
and the Bank was compelled to go through a lengthy trial. 
At the time of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
counsel for the Bank, believing that the last-minute allega-
tion concerning an oral agreement was n:ade in bad faith and 
for the purpose of del~y, went on record to this effect and 
to the effect that if bad faith could be proved he would ask 
for sanctions. 
Plaintiffs' conduct at trial evidences the total lack 
of substance in this allegation. At no time while question-
ing witnesses did counsel for Plaintiffs even address the 
issue. That such an oral agreement existed was disputed by 
- 9 -
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Defendants and unsupported by the circumstances surrounding 
the taking of the loan, as revealed by the evidence actually 
given at trial. The record shows that Barton was questioned 
directly by counsel for Defendants as to whether such an 
oral agreement existed, and he flatly denied it. (R. 795). 
He was not cross-examined on this point, nor was Kennedy or 
any other of Plaintiffs' witnesses directly questioned on 
this issue. The record also shows that the Certificate of 
Deposit was not put up by Barton until 60-90 days after the 
loan was made to the Kennedys (R. 723-724, 769, 785-787, 
795, 897-900), that it was put up at the request of the Bank 
president and in order to satisfy the bank examiners, when 
the Kennedys failed to secure the loan (R. 897-900, 909), 
and that Kennedy assured Barton many times that he would 
never have to repay the loan (R. 737, 741-742, 900). All 
of the evidence on the record supports the opposite conclusion 
from that urged by Plaintiffs --- that no agreement ever 
existed to the effect that the Certificate of Deposit would 
be the first source of funds on default. 
Since Plaintiffs raised the issue of an alleged oral 
agreement, and since they would gain if it were shown to 
exist, they had the burden of proof of establishing its 
- 10 -
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existence. This burden of proof was not met; in fact, 
Plaintiffs made no offers of proof whatsoever at trial. 
They never even addressed the issue, much less brought forth 
any evidence. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction No. 6 (R. 
498), dealing with such an oral agreement, was properly 
refused by the court below. "It is error to instruct the 
jury upon issues raised by the pleadings 
. unless there 
is evidence to support them." Bethel v. Thornbrough, 311 
F.2d 201, 203 (CA 10, Colo., 1962); 75 Am. Jr. 2d, Trial 
§651. 
Since Plaintiffs did not establish the existence of the 
alleged oral agreement at trial, they cannot argue its 
existence to this Court now. As a result, the arguments and 
authorities contained in their brief which bear on the 
effect such an agreement would have on the parties' obliga-
tions are irrelevant and should be disregarded by this 
Court. 
C. The Bank, at their election, may pursue their 
remedies against the Plaintiffs and not against 
the Guarantor Barton. 
At several points in their brief Plaintiffs hint at 
some kind of conspiracy between the Bank and Barton, or the 
use of undue influence on Barton's part, to see that Barton 
would never have to pay on the note. On page 9 of Plaintiff's 
brief they state that "the next fundamental answer [as to 
- 11 -
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why Barton should be forced to pay the debt] arises from the 
unique relationship obviously inherent where Barton is both 
a Director and a substantial shareholder of the Bank and is 
in a position to influence the Bank management to pursue 
only Kennedy rather than pursuing him". After thus specu-
ating on the possibility that a bank director could use 
undue influence in such a situation, Plaintiffs leap to the 
concluded fact: "Such improper influence should not be 
countenanced by this Court". The second proposition does 
not follow from the first, and there is no evidence to 
support it. On page 5, Plaintiffs refer to a "knowing and 
intentional plan implemented by the Bank and Barton to 
relieve Barton of any responsibility whatever," and through-
out the brief there are other references to such a plan. 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence at the trial, however, to 
support their allegations of conspiracy and undue influence. 
These are serious allegations, and cannot be inferred from 
thin air. In the absence of any evidence supporting these 
accusations they must be disregarded. 
Plaintiffs seem to think that it is somehow wrong of 
the Bank to try to get the principal debtor on a loan to pay 
back the money he borrowed. On page 10 of their brief they 
say that "For the Bank to proceed without enforcing the just 
- 12 -
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obligation against Barton or the collateral is both immoral 
and unlawful". It is neither immoral nor unlawful. It is 
entirely equitable' and is firmly supported by the law. 
Upon default, the holder of a note may proceed against 
either the maker or the guarantor, or both, at his option. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §1090. Similarly, the 
holder of a note isn't bound to sue an endorser for the 
protection of the maker. Ibid. Since the liabilities of a 
primary obligor and a secondary obligor are several, and not 
joint, if the holder gets a judgment against the maker that 
does not release parties who are secondarily liable on the 
note. Ibid., §959. However, even if the holder voluntarily 
releases a party secondarily liable, the principle debtor 
must still pay the debt. In First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth 
City v. Hinton, 216 N.C. 159, 4 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1939), 
where the holder of notes discharged the accommodation 
endorser, and the maker then claimed that his liability 
should be reduced to the extent of the notes signed by the 
accommodation endorser, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
said: 
"But while the release of the maker from his obligation 
releases the surety or endorser, since it discharges 
the debt, and while partial release has the same effect 
- 13 -
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pro tanto, the release of the surety or accommodation 
endorser does not relieve the principal debtor. There 
is no obligation between the maker and the accommodation 
endorser that the latter shall pay the debt, and there 
is no equity in favor of the maker to require that the 
endorser shall do so." 
Additionally, there is no requirement that the holder 
of a note attempt to collect against the collateral before 
proceeding against the endorsers or maker. Hurt v Citizens 
Trust Company, 128 Ga. App. 224, 196 S.E.2d 349 (1973). 
This rule is especially appropriate where collateral has 
been supplied by the accommodating party rather than by the 
maker. A holder's authority to sue upon the note without 
first exhausting his security has been codified in Utah 
through the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §70A-9-50l provides in 
part: 
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, 
a secured party .•. may reduce his claim to judgment, 
foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by 
any available judicial procedure. 
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in 
1965, §78-37-1 of the judicial code required a creditor to 
first exhaust his security before he could get a deficiency 
judgment, whether the mortgage was on realty or on chattels. 
This statute was amended in 1965 to be consistent with the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and it now applies 
- 14 -
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only to mortgages on real property. This modification was 
explained in Justice Ellett's concurring opinion in Olsen v. 
Chappell, 20 U.2d 115, 433 P.2d, lOll, at 1012 (1967): 
"The cited statute, (78-37-1), U.C.A. 1953) prior to 
1965 did provide that mortgages on realty and chattels 
must be foreclosed before deficiency could be taken 
against the mortgagor; and had this statute been the 
law at the time this suit was brought, we can be sure 
it would have been raised and argued to us here. 
However, the statute cited was amended by Chapter 172, 
Laws of Utah 1965, so as to delete the reference to 
personal property. Now, the mortgagee need not foreclose 
a chattel mortgage before suing upon the note •.. " 
These authorities clearly establish that the Bank has a 
right to proceed against the Kennedys, who are the principal 
debtors on this note, without being legally required to 
proceed at the same time against a person who is only secon-
darily liable. 
D. It is equitable that the Plaintiffs should be 
required to pay this debt. 
In discussing the equities of this case (Appellants' 
brief, pp. 9-10), Plaintiffs claim that Barton should be 
forced to repay this loan, rather than the Kennedys, because 
"he agreed to do so, and the Bank accepted the obligation in 
reliance on the expectation that Barton would pay or that 
the Certificate would be used to pay". These statements are 
simply false. Barton did not unconditionally agree to pay 
- 15 -
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the loan --- he agreed to guarantee it; that is, to pay it 
only in the event that the Kennedys defaulted on the loan 
and had absolutely no assets to pay it. And the Bank did 
not loan the Kennedys the money in the expectation that 
Barton would pay it back; they fully expected that the 
Kennedys, who received the money from the loan, would pay it 
back. That is the usual creditor-debtor understanding. 
Barton's position was understood from the first to be one of 
secondary liability only; he was to provide insurance for 
the loan in the event of absolute default by the Kennedys. 
Because the Kennedys were the parties who benefited 
from the loan, it would only be equitable to require them to 
pay it back. Barton never received any of the proceeds from 
the original loan or from any of the renewals had by the 
Kennedys (R. 721, 305-306). The proceeds from the original 
loan were used by the Kennedys to purchase land in Montana 
(R. 721, 733) which they still own, and the proceeds from 
the various renewals were used in Mr. Kennedy's business 
ventures. 
Over the years, Barton repeatedly went out of his way 
to help his friend Kennedy with the Bank loans. He origi-
nally recommended the Kennedys for a loan with the Bank of 
Ephraim at their request (R. 894), and he signed that note 
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as guarantor, again at Kennedy's request (R. 895-896). When 
the Kennedys failed to secure their loan as Barton had 
expected they would, and the Bank requested Barton to attach 
his own Certificate of Deposit to the note in order to 
satisfy the bank examiners, he did so (R. 785-787). Over 
the years he repeatedly helped the Kennedys to get renewals 
and extensions on their loans (R. 735-739). And in 1972, in 
order to enable the Kennedys to get still another extension, 
Barton paid $4,095 worth of interest on the loan (R. 726, 
737-738, 914-918), an amount which the Kennedys did not 
repay, and which was awarded Barton in the court below. At 
about the same time that Barton was paying the interest on 
the Kennedys' loan, and unknown to him, they were borrowing 
money on their Montana land, which was not applied to the 
Bank of Ephraim loan, or used to repay Barton (R. 731-732, 
799). 
Under the facts of this case it would not be equitable 
to require Barton to repay the Kennedys' loan when the 
Kennedys have sufficient assets to meet this obligation. It 
is their debt and it is just that they should pay it. 
E. Res judicata applies to bar relitigation of 
Plaintiffs' liability to the Bank. 
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Another large part of Appellants' brief (pp. 16-21) 
involves an attempt to explain why the doctrine of res 
judicata should not apply in this case with regard to their 
claims against the Bank, if that doctrine was used by the 
trial court as a reason for dismissing various causes of 
action of the Plaintiffs. If this was a reason used by the 
court below, consideration of the two cases --- this case 
and the action by the Bank against the Kennedys which resul-
ted in a judgment on July 19, 1973 
judicata was applicable. 
will show that res 
The prior judgment was conclusive as to Plaintiffs' 
liability on the note owing to the Bank. In this action 
Plaintiffs are now attempting to assert, as causes of action, 
a number of reasons why they should not be compelled to pay 
that judgment. All of these issues, as far as they concern 
the Bank, either were or should have been raised as defenses 
or counterclaims by the Kennedys in the prior action. 
Whether or not they were raised there, if they are relevant 
to the issue of Plaintiffs' liability, they are now barred 
by res judicata from asserting them. Under the doctrine of 
res judicata, the conclusiveness of the prior judgment 
extends not only to matters actually determined but also to 
other matters which could properly have been raised and 
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determined therein. Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884 (CA 8 
Minn., 1965). In Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U.2d 404, 285 P.2d 
839 (1955), this Court said that: 
"Generally, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is an 
adjudication, not merely as to the existence of the 
plaintiff's cause of action, but as to the non-
existence of any defenses thereto." 285 P.2d 839 at 
841. 
And in the same case, the Court held: 
"A counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter 
involving the same transaction is forever barred." 285 
P.2d 839 at 842. 
This latter holding was said to follow from the "compulsory 
counterclaim rule," codified as Rule 13(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
in part: 
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader 
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction." 
Under these authorities, Plaintiffs cannot now raise issues 
which could properly have been included in the prior action. 
A related claim of Plaintiffs' is that this is not the 
same cause of action. They point out that the prior action 
was for a judgment on a note, then describe this case as 
- 19 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
involving tort claims plus "additional claims relating to 
the certificate" (p. 19 of Appellants' brief). It is not 
the labels used which determine whether the cause of action 
is the same. In Rhodes v. Jones, supra, it was said: 
"A 'cause of action' is a situation or state of facts 
which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives 
him the right to seek judicial interference in his 
behalf." 351 F.2d 884 at 886. 
Whatever names the Plaintiffs use, they are attempting to 
deny their liability to the Bank, and that question has 
already been settled. 
Plaintiffs assert that res judicata cannot apply because 
their counterclaim was not heard on the merits in the prior 
action. Their counterclaim was dismissed at trial because 
they presented no evidence in support of their allegations. 
What is important to determining whether a judgment was on 
the merits is whether the parties had an opportunity to be 
heard. In 50 C.J.S., Judgments §627 it is said: 
"It is not necessary, however, that there should 
have been a trial. If the judgment is general, and not 
based on any technical defect or objection, and the 
parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on 
their respective claims and contentions, it is on the 
merits, although there was no actual hearing or argument 
on the facts of the case." 
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Since Plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard, the judgment 
was on the merits, whether or not the Plaintiffs chose to 
substantiate their claims. 
The only necessary parties to the question of liability 
on the loan made by the Bank to the Kennedys, were the Bank 
and the Kennedys. As far as the issue of Plaintiffs' liabil-
ity is concerned, it must be considered determined by the 
July 19, 1973 judgment. The Plaintiffs cannot now readjudi-
cate this same issue under a claim that the parties are 
different, since it was incumbent on them to join any parties 
they felt to be necessary in the prior action, after naming 
them in any possible counterclaims. Since Plaintiffs failed 
to do so, they should not now be allowed to relitigate the 
same issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal are totally without 
merit and the judgment for the Bank rendered below should be 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VINCENT 
ohn R. 
orneys for Defendants Bank of 
phraim, Virgil P. Jacobsen, 
Curtis J. Armstrong, L. Cannon 
Anderson and Ruel E. Christensen, 
Respondents 
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